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Concerns that technological progress degrades job opportunities have been expressed over much 
of the last two centuries by both professional economists and the general public. These concerns 
can be seen in narratives both in scholarly publications and in the news media.  Part of the 
expressed concern about jobs has been about the potential for increased economic inequality. But 
another part of the concern has been about a perceived decline in job quality in terms of its effects 
on monotony vs creativity of work, individual sense of identity, power to act independently, and 
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Fears about the effects of labor-saving machines on our jobs, as these machines replace many 
tasks, have a long history. The fears are expressed both in professional writings of economists 
and in popular stories. We here give a brief history of narratives expressing these fears and 
briefly consider the relevance of such narratives for public policy.  
 The term “narrative” is often used as a synonym for “story,” a sequence of events. But 
the word narrative has an important other aspect. A narrative is a telling of a story, that attaches 
meaning and significance to it, that often is intended as providing a lesson or a moral. A 
narrative can become an interpretation of ongoing events by comparing them with a story. With 
economic narratives, the narrative may represent a proto-economic model, understandable by the 
most general public.  
 Especially important among narratives are those about our life’s work—our jobs. While 
people in jobs of low prestige may not express much delight in telling the story of their life of 
work, it is a story they think about and that defines their contribution to loved ones and to 
society. 
 In my 2017 American Economic Association presidential address Narrative Economics, 
and in a forthcoming book with the same name, I have been arguing that it is important for 
economists to appreciate the popular economic narratives that go viral, that come and go 
according to epidemiological patterns. Just as a disease, an economic narrative, a story that is 
connected to things that matter in the economy, rises like an epidemic to influence a large 
fraction of the population. The epidemic alters their economic actions and their voting. It then 
influences government economic policy, and also drives economic fluctuations. During the 
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growth phase of the narrative epidemic, the contagion rate has to be above the forgetting rates, 
allowing the narrative to grow in influence. Eventually the narrative fades away, after the 
contagion rate falls below the forgetting rate. Then the narrative may mutate, as viruses do, and 
another epidemic may return again, and again. 
 In this paper I will present a brief history of thought on both professional and public 
narratives related to the effects of machines replacing jobs. The immediate concern most 
expressed is that one will lose a job altogether, resulting in poverty and unemployment. But the 
spell of unemployment may not be the dominant concern. There is also the fear that the resulting 
eventual job switch will be to a job that is demeaning. 
In a psychologically healthy environment, narratives establish honored membership in 
community. Everyone wants to be loved. Everyone feels a deep need to be part of a community 
that at the very least respects one’s contribution. Narratives about jobs are among the most vivid, 
since we tend to spend most of our lives working in the market economy and to define ourselves 
in terms of our work there.  
Ancient Religious and Philosophical Narratives about Work 
In the book Ecclesiastes, in the Bible, written between 400 BCE and 180 BCE, a concept 
of meaning in work is laid out in vivid poetry: 
III-1There is a time for everything, and a season for every activity under heaven. a time 
to be born and a time to die, a time to plant and a time to uproot, . . . 
V-11 As goods increase, so do those who consume them, and to what benefit are they to 
the owner except to feast his eyes on them? 
V-18 Then I realized that it is good and proper for a man to eat and drink, and to find 
satisfaction in his toilsome labor under the sun during the few days of life God has 
given him—for this is his lot.1 
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The book Ecclesiastes in its New International translation uses the word “meaning” or 
“meaningless” repeatedly. (The King James translation used the word “vanity” or “vanities”.) It 
is a book about the meaning of life. In fact, the opening line of Ecclesiastes is  
“’I-2 Meaningless! Meaningless!’   says the Teacher. ‘Utterly meaningless! Everything 
is meaningless’.”  
 
But that was an expression of despair, and the book comes around to finding meaning in day-to-
day work. 
The religious narrative is not absent even for people who do not go to church, temple or 
Mosque at all, transmitted by ordinary talk, or in news or songs or plays. Work is as inevitable as 
the changing seasons or the life cycle. Consumption of goods beyond what is necessary may be 
meaningless. Toilsome labor is not onerous because it is part of our life story. 
 Economists are accustomed to writing utility functions that depend positively on 
consumption of goods and negatively on labor supplied. But poems like the above are suggesting 
something very different. 
 This Ecclesiastes poem has a long history, I would say a long epidemic, the poem is 
contagious. It generates new epidemics from time to time, like a disease mutation starting a new 
epidemic. In the late 1950s, the folk singer Pete Seeger wrote a song, entitled “Turn, Turn, Turn” 
that took the opening words from Ecclesiastes III above. It became a number one hit on the 
Billboard Top 100 when it was recorded by The Byrds in 1965, got further impetus with Judy 
Collins in 1969, Emmylou Harris, yet other singers, and in plays and movies.  
The protestant revolution, the Reformation, starting in the year 1517, was associated with 
a renegade Catholic monk, Martin Luther. Luther emphasized that every person has a Beruf, a 
calling, denying the then-extant emphasis on martyrdom. According to Luther, the work one 
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does has religious significance, and is deep with meaning about one’s identity and purpose in 
life. One’s work is not just one’s lot in life, it is a source of inspiration. 
 A secular account of the pleasure in work is revealed in personal accounts of the meaning 
of work—placing the work as part of a life story. These longstanding concerns about the 
meaning of work continue today. The concerns about loss of meaning were expressed long 
before the appearance of significant labor-saving machines and continue today even beyond 
concerns about such machines. Changes in business procedures to routinize and standardize jobs, 
reduce the jobs to narrow tasks that machines cannot do yet, may have serious effects on the 
meaning of work.  
For example, the advent of chain stores, whose very beginnings can also be traced back 
to the 19th or even the 18th century, seems to stir up the same feelings of loss of meaning. Such 
“Formula businesses” are in many cases banned by local communities, who do not want to see 
their unique spirit invaded by standardized and vulgarized businesses. 
  
Narratives during the Eighteenth Century and the Industrial Revolution  
Early indications of public concerns about the modern degradation of job quality may not have 
mentioned machines at all, though one suspects that the advent of the industrial revolution 
played a real role. A 1785 farmer, in an article written for the Connecticut Courant, the ancestor 
of today’s Hartford Courant, describes his wondering if he should leave the farm and become a 
part of the more exciting urban environment. It is a narrative about the meaning of life, also a 
scene of happiness, though maybe not the same as joy in the repetitive tasks themselves. He 
describes a farm that seems to be comprised of only him and his wife, and a happy scene:  
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When young I entertained some thoughts of selling my farm. I thought it 
afforded but a dull repetition of the same labours and pleasures. I thought the former 
tedious and heavy, the latter few and insipid; but when I came to consider myself as 
divested of my farm, I then found the world so wide, and every place so full, that I 
began to fear lest there would be no room for me.2 
His narrative includes scenes of simple pleasures on the farm:  
My wife would often come with her knitting in her hand, and sit under the shady 
trees, praising the straightness of my furrows, and the docility of my horses; this 
swelled my heart and made every thing light and pleasant, and I regretted I had not 
married before.3 
He also asserted that his farming was a statement of mastery and freedom: 
The instant I enter on my own land, the bright idea of property, of exclusive 
right, of independence, exalts my mind. Precious soil, I say to myself, by what singular 
custom of law is it that thou wast made to constitute the riches of the freeholder? What 
should we American farmers be without the distinct possession of that soil?4  
He does not mention labor-saving machinery in this piece, though his perceptions of life in the 
city might already show some influence from that. But one can imagine from what he says that 
he would not entirely welcome a machine that makes his plowing unnecessary. 
The idea of robots got a firm foothold in the public imagination in the eighteenth century, 
though the word “robot” was not to come until the twentieth century.  A Google Ngrams search 
shows that books referred to them as “automatons,” starting in the late 18th century, and this term 
saw another variation, “automation” in the second half of the twentieth century. The word 
“creativity” took hold toward the end of the twentieth century, perhaps in reaction to these 
supposedly intelligent humanoid machines who lacked it. 
In 1769 the renowned inventor Wolfgang von Kempelen produced “The Turk,” a chess-
playing robot in the form of a dummy in Turkish clothing seated attached to a large cabinet filled 
with machinery, on top of which was a chessboard. Visitors were invited to open the doors to the 
cabinet and look inside, where they saw some machinery. The device was designed so that a 
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complex mechanism obscured their view so that they could not see that there was a man, a chess 
master, hiding inside. A system of magnets allowed the hidden man underneath the chessboard to 
see the positions of the pieces on the chessboard, and a system of controls allowed him to move 
the arms of the automaton, and thus to move the chess pieces. The machine played chess 
brilliantly, defeating both Napoleon Bonaparte and Benjamin Franklin. The popularity of the 
word “automaton” begins with the von Kempelen narrative and lasts to the present day. Did 
people believe the machine was real? Their willingness to believe was enhanced since von 
Kempelen was also a renowned inventor, and his apparatus was cleverly done. Probably many 
did believe, but skepticism was also rampant, since they could not see how such a machine could 
possibly work. 
The invention of the water-powered roller gin by Joseph Eve in 1788 and of the cotton 
gin by Eli Whitney in 1793 began to draw attention to the loss of jobs that might be occasioned 
by new machines. The new machines removed the seeds from cotton bolls so that they could be 
spun into cotton for cloth. The gin was vastly quicker than the hand-picking at the seeds that 
preceded it. This development occasioned some concern that the new machines would depress 
the price of slaves in the southern United States, since it would replace one of their main 
occupations. 
One would think that if these machines were replacing manual labor, there would surely 
be concern expressed for the investment value of slaves. A search for articles about the price of 
slaves and labor-saving machinery produced only a little. Many years after the 18th century, The 
Picayune in New Orleans, a precursor after merger with the Times-Democrat to today’s Times 
Picayune there, wrote in 1859, just before the American Civil War that resulted in the 
emancipation of the slaves, referring to a northern newspaper article: 
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The Philadelphia American and Gazette gets off a theory, in its peculiar style, to 
the effect that the South is opposed to labor saving machinery because “saving labor 
depreciates the slave.” It is mistaken, both in the fact and the reason. It was not a fact 
that the South has an antipathy to labor saving machinery, nor is it true that “steam as 
the slave and ingenuity as its driver” reduces the value of black labor of the slave 
States.5 
The fact that slave prices were generally increasing right up to the Civil War has recently 
been called the “Cotton Gin Paradox.6 Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman added another 
element to the paradox, that slave prices should have been depressed as the abolitionist fury 
gained strength as the 19th century progressed, up to the Civil War, which should have 
shown an increasing probability that the slaves would be freed.7 
Some of the earliest mechanization examples were threshing machines, which separated 
wheat from chaff. Andrew Meikle invented a celebrated thresher in 1786, which offered to 
replace a major task on traditional farms. It was powered by horses. The horse-powered 
machines led to a view of mechanization that suggested that at issue was the replacement of 
people by horses.  
Thomas Paine was an extremely important thinker. In the context of the American 
Revolution, his book Common Sense, which appeared in early 1776, was a huge bestseller by 
July when the U.S. Declaration of Independence was signed. Less well remembered is his book 
Agrarian Justice 1797. He was worried already about the superfluity of labor, but not so much in 
the context of labor-saving machines, a concept he does not mention. But his model of the world 
was that of a single limiting constraint in an agricultural economy: land. His references to land 
are akin to the references to robots today. Who owns the land was the winner, instead of who 
owns the robots. 
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Thomas Paine wasn’t describing the world of the future, he was describing the world of 
time immemorial, when labor was, in his view, already largely redundant, already in poverty. He 
did not seem to think of labor as a factor of production, but as merely a moral obligation to 
society. He advocated a sort of universal basic income to be given to everyone. 
 
Nineteenth Century Economists’ Narratives 
Following the Luddite riots in 1811, economists began to be thinking about the effects of labor-
saving machinery on the price of labor. In his 1821 third edition to his On the Principles of 
Economics and Taxation, ten years after the Luddite rebellion, David Ricardo added a “Chapter 
XXXI: On Machines.”8 In that new chapter he said that he had made a mistake on the impact of 
labor-saving machines on human society: 
My mistake arose from the suggestion, that whenever the net income of a society 
increased, its gross income would also increase. I now, however, see reason to be 
satisfied that the one fund, from which landlords and capitalists derive their revenue, 
may increase, while the other, that upon which the laboring class mainly depend, may 
diminish, and therefore it follows, if I am right, that the same cause which may increase 
the net revenue of the economy, may at the same time render the population redundant, 
and deteriorate the condition of labourers.9 
Ricardo gives an example of what might happen if new machinery allows the more effective use 
of horses. Then, capitalist farmers might substitute horses for hired men, and divert the resources 
for feeding the men to feeding the increased population of horses, with a consequential hardship 
for men. This is the flipside of Wassily Leontief’s famous comparison of men with horses in the 
twentieth century, observing that mechanization has finally eliminated most of the need for 




 Alfred Marshall in his 1890 first edition of the textbook Principles of Economics wrote in 
a chapter on the division of labor tied the advent of laborsaving machines with the 
standardization of tasks: 
We are thus led to a general rule, the action of which is more prominent in some 
branches of manufactures than others, but which applies to all. It is, that any 
manufacturing operation that can be reduced to uniformity, so that exactly the same 
thing has to be done over and over again in the same way, is sure to be taken over 
sooner or later by machinery.11 
He discussed the monotony of such work, but said it is not necessarily contrary to happiness: 
Monotony of Work is an Evil of the First Order Only When It Involves Monotony of 
Life. . .The social surroundings of factory life stimulate mental activity in and out of 
working hours, and many factory workers, whose occupations are seemingly the most 
monotonous, have considerable intelligence and mental resources.12 
Marshall in this same textbook anticipates the frequently expressed modern view that machinery 
replaces tasks for labor, but creates new tasks, which Acemoglu and Restrepo have called the 
“displacement effect” and the “reinstatement effect.” Marshall anticipates these effects in his 
1890 textbook: 
Thus machinery constantly supplants and renders unnecessary that purely manual skill, 
the attainment of which was, even up to Adam Smith’s time, the chief advantage of 
division of labour. But this influence is more than countervailed by its tendency to 
increase the scale of manufactures and to make them more complex; and therefore to 
increases the opportunities for division of labour of all kinds, and especially in the 
matter of business management.”13 
The same idea has also been expressed quite recently by David Autor, a labor economist, who 
puts the current situation into perspective after centuries of worry about machines replacing jobs: 
“Why hasn’t automation already wiped out employment for the vast majority of workers?” was 
the title of a 2016 paper. His answer: “Tasks that cannot be substituted by automation are 
generally complemented by it.”14 
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 But note that this principal that automation creates jobs is not a theorem in basic 
economics. It could be otherwise, and manual labor could see its fortunes collapse, just as 
Ricardo insisted. 
 
Twentieth to Twenty-First Centuries Narratives 
 The word “robot” finally entered the languages of the world in 1920 with the play 
Rossum’s Universal Robots by the Czech playwright Karel Čapek. This play coined the word 
robot, from the Czech word for slave. The play was translated from Czech to English and 
became a hit in English-speaking countries, eventually, and spread to much of the world. The 
word robot then entered most of the languages of the world. The story depicted a company, 
headed by a Mr. Domin, that had started producing and selling robots, an invention of Mr. 
Rossum: 
Domin 
What sort of worker do you think is the best from a practical point of view? 
Helena 
Perhaps the one who is most honest and hardworking. 
Domin 
No; the one that is the cheapest. The one whose requirements are the smallest. Young 
Rossum invented a worker with the minimum amount of requirements. He had to 
simplify him. He rejected everything that did not contribute directly to the progress of 
work!—everything that makes man more expensive. In fact, he rejected man and made 
the Robot. My dear Miss Glory, the Robots are not people. Mechanically they are more 
perfect than we are, they have an enormously developed intelligence, but they have no 
soul. 
 
The play gives no space to the thought that the robots might make one unemployed. Instead it is 
a vision of a horrible world without love and feeling. The robots in Karel Čapek’s play 
eventually rise up and kill almost all humans. 
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 A Google Ngrams search shows that a new term “technological unemployment,” 
unemployment caused by new machines, rose rapidly into prominence in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Then in the 1960s there was another epidemic of attention to the problem of machines replacing 
jobs, with a newly popular word, “automation.” One observer in 1965 wrote a book The 
Automation Hysteria which descried a “huge spate of alarmist literature” about this automation, 
and fears then of a future of unemployment worse than that of the Great Depression.15 The term 
“Triple Revolution” suddenly and briefly appeared in the 1960s too, the three revolutions being 
automation, weapons of mass destruction, and expanding human rights. 
But the automation hysteria of that time was not just about the loss of jobs per se. Robert 
Theobald wrote an influential book in 1963, Free Men and Free Markets, that argued for 
deciding on a new and revised version of work and its meaning. He was an economist of sorts, 
though he dropped out of graduate school at Harvard. His book called for the government 
providing everyone with a “Due Income” (Basic Income). He was not enthusiastic about policies 
to promote high employment, asking, what is good about keeping people on the assembly line? 
He expressed faith in people: people will find something more meaningful to do when freed from 
drudgery.  The question is not "How do we find jobs for everybody?" but "How do we find 
purpose and meaning and rights to resources for everybody" — which is a completely different 
question.” 
 Robert Theobald’s rise to fame was rapid, so that by the 1960s he was one of the most 
famous economists, in the 1960s after the publication of Free Men and Free Markets briefly 
outshining superstars Kenneth Arrow and Paul Samuelson. But, following typical epidemic 
curve pattern, his fame dropped precipitously, so he is almost forgotten today. His due income 
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narrative continues, but he was not the originator of the idea and his name is no longer attached 
to it. 
 Another influential voice at this time was John Kenneth Galbraith. In his best-selling1957 
book The Affluent Society he argued, after noting that progress had created a class of a rich and 
self-indulgent class, that: 
The solution is a system of taxation which automatically makes a pro rata share of 
increasing income available to public authority for public purposes. The task of public 
authority, like that of private individuals, will be to distribute this increase in 
accordance with relative need.16 
Concerns about automation as invading our lives were expressed in Herbert Simon’s 1966 
book The Shape of Automation. The book argued that it is not just manual labor that is threatened 
by automation. The jobs of physicians, corporate president and college professors may be 
completely automated. Such a prospect creates uncertainty about how people in these jobs will 
find any work that offers comparable purpose and meaning that they have today.  
The unanswered question from then, to today, is whether there will still be a demand for the 
augmentation of this automation with the uniquely human. The need seems to be, as expressed 
by David Autor and David Dorn, “interpersonal interaction, flexibility and adaptability to offer 
services that are uniquely human.”17 This interpretation opens the question whether there could 
be jobs in the future that are also uniquely meaningful to human beings. 
Edmund Phelps in his book Rewarding Work (1997, 2007) said that work is “the main 
source of people’s personal and intellectual development.” Phelps poses a question to himself:  
. . .but surely there is not much mental stimulation and intellectual development 
provided by the jobs filled by disadvantaged people, is there? I responded that, for most 
people participating in the world of work, even on the bottom rungs, even unstimulating 




Getting “out of the house” seems to be a metaphor for getting connected with larger society. 
Phelps proposes a subsidy to employers of low-productivity earners, so that the employees see it 
in their paychecks and do not see the subsidy directly. The subsidy will raise the market price of 
unskilled labor, and gives the appearance that the work of the subsidized labor force is highly 
valued. Well, such a subsidy does make their work highly valued, in the market.  
 One may wonder what economics literature Phelps is referring to when he singles out 
work as such an important aspect of personal and social development. It appears not to be from 
economics journals. If one searches Google Scholar for “work” and “the meaning of life” one 
finds many articles, but not in economics journals. Some of the journals that come up in this 
search are: Journal of Career Assessment, Applied Psychology: Health and Well Being, 
International Journal of Organizational Analysis, Journal of Counseling, Journal of Adolescent 
Research, Personality and Individual Differences, Ethics, and British Journal of Psychology. 
The absence of economic journals on this important topic is part of a bigger problem in academic 
research caused by specialization. 
 Anthony Kronman, former Dean of the Yale Law School, wrote in a 2007 book 
Education's End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the Meaning of Life that 
it is not just economists who are missing the meaning of life:  
Graduate students learn to restrict their attention to a single segment of human 
knowledge and to accept their incompetence to assess, or even understand, the work of 
specialists in other areas. But they also learn to accept the idea that this same narrowing 
of attention, which cuts them off from those in other disciplines, alone qualifies them to 
join the company of fellow specialists in their own field, spread over many generations 
and united in a common commitment to the subject they share. 
 
He argued that we are failing our students, or suggesting that life has no meaning, contrary to 
their deepest instincts. 
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Raghuram Rajan in his 2019 book The Third Pillar: How Markets and the State Leave the 
Community Behind argued that connections to community are far more important than most 
economists imagine. He says here that the community: 
anchors the individual in real human networks and gives them a sense of identity; our 
presence in the world is verified by our impact on people around us.19 
The first pillar of the economy is the markets, the second is the government, and the third is the 
local community, those one sees in the extended family, neighborhood and at work. The local 
community is the place where one’s work narrative is most visible. 
Social Hierarchy and Inequality 
Narratives can trigger deep feelings based on the instinct for hierarchy. The pecking order 
matters to humans just as to chickens. With humans, the story of one’s job affects one’s social 
ranking. But there is in human society no consistent agreement on ranking. Each individual 
savors his or her own imaginary high ranking.  
Political talk is strong on narratives about jobs. Politicians in the United States frequently 
refer to “hardworking Americans.”  One sees colorful appreciations of a life of hard work in 
obituaries, which often see fit to praise a life of devotion and hard work. For example, from an 
obituary in the 1930s:  
Mr. Lloyd, whose puzzles challenged newspaper readers for more than 30 years, 
originated 10,000 puzzles by his own estimate. His goal was to create one puzzle a day. 
Working eight hours a day, in his Brooklyn studio he turned out an average of 300 a 
year.”20  
Such colorful stories work to define a person’s identity, his or her real significance in life. The 
stories involve suggestions of broad categories of social ranking but also the little details, of 
literary quality, like the one puzzle a day. Mr. Lloyd was significant because he appears to have 
been a unique source of pleasure to millions of people. Mr. Lloyd’s occupation, and its meaning 
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to him in life, appears to be relatively less threatened by labor-saving machinery, but most 
people feel some insecurity in the security of their perceived narrative. 
 The narratives around the job, or lack of a traditional job, depends on the choice of words 
describing the activities of the person. Lack of a traditional job may be compensated for by the 
narrative that is applied to nonwork. Thus, today, people retiring on a pension take it as 
acceptable to go through decades of retirement without traditional work, because of the narrative 
that has emerged around them. In the United States, “Social Security,” with its “OASDI,” “Old 
Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance” has associated with it different narratives, that are far 
less controversial than any other form of redistribution to reduce economic inequality, even 
though it is just as well considered largely an institution to tax the rich and transfer to the poor. 
The difference is that it identifies only with sources of inequality that have good positive 
narratives, and it is framed as insurance, which is something paid for and earned.  
 Moreover, the fact that the narrative involves paying in to the insurance, with a deduction 
from one’s paycheck called F.I.C.A. for Federal Insurance Contributions Act, it is framed as a 
purchase for one’s own benefit. In fact, one is compelled to make the purchase, and for higher 
income people the purchase is not advantageous. Still, the fact that one paid for it seems to make 
the income redistribution acceptable. More than acceptable, the narrative of social security 
makes the system practically immortal. President Roosevelt, when asked in 1941 about the 
mandatory contributions for Social Security, said  
“We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, 
and political right to collect their pensions and their unemployment benefits. With 





Some Policy Alternatives in Light of the Narrative History 
The history of thought presented here highlights the fact that people have for centuries been 
concerned, when confronted with labor saving machines, with not only their effects on their 
incomes, but also with something deeper, the meaning of work and life, a concept which our 
psychology will not let us neglect. 
The rise of populism and retreat into nationalism around much of the world in the twenty-
first century may be related to past technological unemployment and as well to the narratives of 
loss of self-esteem. The potential for conflict from this event is worrisome. 
Some kind of redistribution of income has long been advocated, in response to labor-
saving machinery, as we have seen. In choosing among variants of this redistribution, it is 
important to consider the kinds of narratives that would be encouraged by the choice made.  
Some kinds of income redistribution look like charity or bailout, and as injustice to higher 
income people who may have worked hard for their success. Redress of inequality could be 
achieved along different lines than direct redistribution. We have seen the example of Social 
Security, that has been presented as a form of insurance rather than a tax. I argued in my 2003 
book that framing our strategy for dealing with dislocations caused by labor-saving machinery as 
a form of insurance, collecting insurance premia today to provide protection against possibly 
much worse inequality in future decades, may make it a better narrative.21 I then called it 
“inequality insurance.” That name may not be suggesting the right story. The word “insurance” 
sounds honorable and apt, but the word “inequality” seems to suggest a narrative that the policy 
is a form of charity for the losers. Perhaps a name for a government program protecting people 
could be named after existing long-standing government social insurance. In the United States it 
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could be “human capital insurance” or even called something like “Social Security Part B” 
borrowing authority from an existing insurance program that is widely accepted.  
President Franklin Roosevelt attempted such a reframing of narrative by naming his 
Depression program “The New Deal.” It was inspired by a 1932 book with that title by one of his 
advisors, Stuart Chase. Thus the entire edifice of his redistributive policies was defined as a sort 
of business deal rather than a charity. The policies are thus presented with a positive orientation, 
and a business narrative, overcoming resistance and shame as from living off the government, 
upon retirement. 
Private long-term “livelihood insurance” as I called it in my 2003 book, which could also 
be called occupational income insurance, could also help protect people who are investing in 
risky human capital, protecting against technological progress reducing the remuneration and 
quality of jobs in their specified field or area. Such insurance could not only protect people 
against career risks as measured by occupational income indices, but also enhance a narrative of 
risk-taking with human capital, investing in forms of one’s human capital whose subsequent 
advantages are uncertain. The policies would by pay out to a beneficiary if an occupational 
income index for the beneficiary’s category declines. With such a narrative, this insurance would 
not have the stigma of charity or government redistribution. With such insurance, there could be 
a name of the product, such as entrepreneur’s insurance, or a name that suggests a story of 
adventuresome human-capital investment. The sales literature for the private insurance could 
emphasize that it would enable people to make risky but possibly highly successful human 
capital investments, by telling stories of other human-capital entrepreneurs that are suggestive of 
a personal narrative. The insurance may thus enhance both the stability of personal income and 
the sense of meaning in work. 
20 
 
Mentorship programs for young people have been growing exponentially since around 
1980, in recognition of the powerful force friendship with otherwise distant successful people 
can have on the youth’s self-image and personal narrative. Such mentoring is especially 
important for segments of the population that already feel excluded from a success narrative.22  
Such mentoring could also be tilted towards helping them define themselves in terms of a life 
story of their contribution to society, a human contribution that might never be entirely replaced 
by machines. Such a narrative might cause them to take actions that put their livelihood at risk, 
but at the same time would help them maintain their self-esteem if such risk-taking puts them in 
a situation where they must accept help in maintaining their living standard. 
With the long history of concern about the meaning of work that we have seen here, it 
seems that it must be that innovations, in the form of different kinds risk management 
institutions, or of jobs, or of mentorship, may be as important to promoting human welfare in the 
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